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PROCEDURAL AND STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
IN CHALLENGING ASPECTS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
John Boston'
I am going to analyze the various procedural and structural
obstacles facing an attorney pursuing a decision on the merits in
litigation challenging aspects of the criminal justice system. Some
of the things that I am going to talk about are particular to
litigation about criminal justice. Others are applicable to litigation
generally, though they may have applications that are particular to
criminal justice litigation. In fairness, the word obstacle and the
image of an obstacle course may be a bit clichdd given the
complexity, contrivance, and contortion that is involved in some of
the legal doctrines that I will talk about here. Maybe a better
metaphor is miniature golf, which may better convey the
whimsical and arbitrary quality of some of these legal rules from
the standpoint of a plaintiff seeking a remedy for a constitutional
wrong.
The first issue I want to address is the Younger v. Harris
John Boston is Project Director of the Prisoners' Rights Project of the New
York City Legal Aid Society. Mr. Boston received his J.D. from New York
University Law School in 1975.
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abstention doctrine.2 Younger arose when a college professor,
prosecuted under a state criminal syndicalism law for his political
statements, sought to have his prosecution enjoined in federal
court.' The Supreme Court stated, in an opinion emphasizing the
phrase "Our Federalism" (capital 0, capital F), that a federal court
injunction of a state prosecution was not permitted.4 I am not
going to discuss the federalism rationale extensively because I
think it is pretty familiar by now. However, Younger v. Harris has
spawned a large amount of case law and a large family of rules
which can be stated relatively clearly.
The basic Younger rules are as follows: You cannot obtain
an injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution in
federal court.' You cannot get a declaratory judgment either.6 You
can get a declaratory judgment against a threatened prosecution
and a preliminary injunction on a sufficient showing of irreparable
harm.7 There is, however, an exception. If you attempt to obtain a
2401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3 Id. at 41-42.
4 Id. at 54.
' Id at 43-44.
6 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-73 (1971).
7 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, 422
U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
2
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declaratory judgment after the prosecution has already begun and
you have not yet accomplished anything of substance in the federal
court proceeding, you cannot obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief.' This places the attorney in a difficult position. For, if the
attorney should wait until the prosecution has concluded and then
subsequently seek to overturn the state court result in a federal
court proceeding, he or she will not be able to do that either. That
attempt to overturn the state decision will be viewed as an affront
to the state, which is as great as preventing it from having the
proceeding in the first place.9
Moreover, you cannot "cherry pick." You cannot go into
federal court and try to get rulings on individual issues that are part
of a pending or threatened criminal prosecution, for example by
arguing in federal court that an illegal seizure amounted to a
constitutional violation and that the federal judge should instruct
the state court judge that the evidence cannot be used against the
defendant. '
8 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1975).
9 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-09 (1975).
'( Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1971).
3
Boston: Criminal Justice System
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
572 TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol 19
The Younger abstention doctrine has been extended from
state judicial proceedings to include state civil proceedings where
the state is prosecuting an enforcement action or where an
important state interest is involved." When was the last time the
Supreme Court said a state interest was not important? I cannot
recall such a case. The Younger doctrine has also been extended to
administrative proceedings that are quasi-judicial in nature and
allow constitutional claims to be raised. 2
An important premise of the Younger doctrine is that issues
such as the constitutionality of a state statute or a claim of
unconstitutionally motivated prosecution can and should be raised
as part of the state criminal prosecution. That is usually true, and
for that reason, the Younger rule is well grounded in the logic of
coordinate court systems. There are instances when state and
" See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1987) (enforcement of
private state court judgment); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (state bar disciplinary proceeding); Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (1977) (attachment proceeding alleging
welfare fraud); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt proceeding);
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 594 (nuisance proceeding against obscene film). But see
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-73
(1989) (refusing to apply Younger to judicial review proceeding reviewing
legislative or executive action).
2 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619,
626-28 (1986) (holding Younger applicable to sex discrimination case because
the case involved an important state issue); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/3
2003] CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 573
federal courts will be called upon to rule on the same issues
involving the same parties. Thus, it is institutionally necessary that
there be some sort of protection to avoid conflicting rulings
between court systems on the same point. Essentially, these are
necessary traffic rules.
However, that conclusion is not the end of the story.
Sometimes there are issues in the prosecution of criminal cases that
cannot be raised in the context of a single criminal prosecution.
One of the paradigm cases here is the Supreme Court's decision in
Gerstein v. Pugh.'3  In Gerstein, the issue was the failure to
provide timely probable cause hearings to arrestees."4 Whether a
defendant received a timely probable cause hearing at the outset of
a state criminal proceeding is not easy to litigate later in the
proceeding. By that time, the grand jury is likely to have already
returned an indictment, or some other proceeding is likely to have
occurred to determine the existence of probable cause, mooting the
U.S. 229, 237-38 (1984) (holding Younger inapplicable to proceedings that state
law said were not part of a judicial proceeding).
"3 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975); accord, Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848, 851 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding relief could be granted against improper pre-
trial detention of juveniles where Commonwealth law provided no adequate
remedy).
14 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
5
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issue for that defendant and leaving the unlawful practice to go
unchallenged. Moreover, in Gerstein, which originated in Florida,
the state system did not provide any procedure by which that issue
could be raised at all.15 The Supreme Court said that since the
matter could not be litigated in the criminal prosecution, the
plaintiffs could pursue a class action to enjoin the challenged
practice, and that action would not be barred by the Younger
doctrine. 6
Beyond the specific holding of Gerstein, there are other
systemic issues in state criminal justice systems that litigants
would like to challenge in federal court. That has proved to be an
extremely difficult proposition. I characterized the Younger
doctrine essentially as a system of traffic rules. That is only part of
the story. They are traffic rules with a penumbra. Now,
penumbras are in bad odor these days, especially penumbras
invoked to benefit ordinary citizens. Penumbras to protect people
in power are much more robust, as you can see if you read the
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions of the last few
" Id. at 105-06.
16 Id. at 108 n.9.
6
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years. 7 There have been a number of cases in which federal courts
have rejected efforts to impose systemic reform on judicial systems
in the manner that they have imposed systemic reforms in other
kinds of institutions.
The starting point in these decisions is the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Shea v. Littleton.8 In O'Shea, there were some
rather sweeping allegations of racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system in Illinois and a demand for injunctive relief." The
Supreme Court decided that the federal courts should not entertain
the case because, among other things, the Court reasoned it might
result in relief that would require an ongoing audit or continuing
federal court supervision of the Illinois state criminal justice
system.2" Of course, continuing federal court supervision or
monitoring of other state institutions is a regular feature of federal
civil rights litigation.2 O'Shea might lead one to wonder why state
'7 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n. v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 769 (2002) (holding that states may not be made parties to federal
administrative proceedings, even though these do not fall within the Eleventh
Amendment's prohibition, because of the need to protect states' dignity).
" 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
'9 Id. at 502.
20 Id. at 500-01.
21 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (addressing incremental
termination of injunctive relief entered two decades earlier in school
desegregation case).
7
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judicial systems should be exempt from the usual remedies in civil
rights litigation.
Professor Burt Neuborne used to lecture on immunity at
these programs, and he was fond of stating - after pointing out that
the strongest of the immunities under Section 1983 is judicial
immunity - that if dentists made the law, there would be a very
powerful dental immunity. I think that the principle underlying
that comment goes far to explain why there is a double standard
when it comes to protecting state criminal justice systems sued for
civil rights violations.
Consider, for example, Hoover v. Wagner, a Seventh
Circuit decision authored by Judge Posner.2 2  In Hoover, the
plaintiffs sought relief in federal court from the administration of a
state court injunction that provided, inter alia, for the number of
feet of distance anti-abortion protestors must leave between
themselves and the women seeking abortions. -3 Judge Posner said
that granting relief in this case would be an "insult to the judicial
and law enforcement officials of Wisconsin .'24 He stated that he
22 47 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1995).
23 Id. at 846.
24 Id. at 851.
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/3
.2003] CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 577
was not relying on the actual holding in Younger, but rather was
relying on "the principles of equity and comity that underlie
Younger."25
One would think that persons wielding the power of
substantial public offices, including judges, would not require this
sort of protection against insult and indignity. As President
Truman famously said, "If you can't stand the heat get out of the
kitchen." However, that is not the attitude that federal judges
apply to state court judges. Practitioners need to be aware of that
fact when attempting to use litigation to remedy even the most
egregious defects in state criminal justice systems.
A particularly disturbing example is the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Luckey v. Miller.6 That case was a challenge to the
notoriously deficient system of providing counsel to the indigent in
the state of Alabama. The court held that the state's system was
protected by the Younger doctrine from any sort of federal court
remedy, even one that did not directly interfere with individual
prosecutions, because of the Younger doctrine as expanded by
25 id
26 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
9
Boston: Criminal Justice System
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
578 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol 19
O'Shea v. Littleton. 7 Decisions like Luckey leave us with the
question: If state courts do not correct their constitutional
dysfunctions, and state legislatures also shirk the task, and if the
federal courts refuse to confront even the most long-standing and
entrenched disobedience of constitutional commands, how will the
Constitution be enforced? The answer appears to be, it won't.
Next, I would like to discuss the rule of Heck v.
Humphrey.28 The plaintiff in Heck brought a federal civil rights
action alleging that the county prosecutors and investigator
responsible for his criminal conviction had destroyed exculpatory
evidence, among other misconduct, and he sought damages from
-them.29 The Supreme Court rejected his claim." It began with the
long-established proposition that a state prisoner cannot challenge
the length or duration of custody under the civil rights statute, but
instead must pursue a writ of habeas corpus after first exhausting
any available state remedy. 3' The Court went on to hold, in
substance, that state prisoners cannot circumvent this process by
27 Id. at 677-79.
28 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
29 Id. at 478-80.
30 Id. at 490.
3' Id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)).
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/3
2003] CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 579
means of a civil action for damages or some other kind of relief.
Specifically, it held that if a civil action "necessarily require[s] the
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or
confinement," the plaintiff must exhaust state remedies and
proceed by habeas corpus regardless of the relief sought.3 2 Indeed,
a Section 1983 claim in such a case does not even accrue until the
criminal defendant's conviction is overturned.33
There are a number of exceptions and qualifications to that
rule that are worth discussing. One of the most important, and at
this point controversial, is the Supreme Court's decision in Spencer
v. Kemna,34 decided a few years after Heck. If you review the
Spencer decision with its several opinions and carefully count on
your fingers, you will find that five Justices assent to the
proposition that if a litigant cannot use federal habeas corpus to
challenge a criminal conviction, that litigant is no longer bound by
the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.3" The most common
case in which a litigant cannot proceed in habeas corpus is likely to
32 Id. at 486.
3' Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90.
34 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
"Id. at 18-19, 21, 25 n.8.
11
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be one in which the litigant was released unconditionally or his
sentence expired before the petition and was, therefore, no longer
"in custody," a jurisdictional requirement of federal habeas
corpus. 6 It is certainly most logical to excuse litigants from the
exhaustion requirement when the passage of time has made
compliance with it impossible, at least so long as the litigant has
not unreasonably delayed filing. Nonetheless, there is a split
among the circuits as to whether or not to adopt the Spencer gloss
on the Heck rule." That is not surprising since the Spencer
exception does not appear in the majority opinion, but rather only
in the plurality and concurring opinions.3"
Another concern is the litigation problem that results
because the line Heck draws, while bright in the abstract, can
36 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). In Spencer itself, the
petitioner was "in custody" because he had filed his petition while still
incarcerated, but his release after a parole revocation mooted his petition since
collateral consequences will not be presumed from a revocation of parole as they
are after a criminal conviction. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 10-17.
37 Compare Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
challenge to juvenile placement and detention was not barred by Heck where no
habeas remedy was available because the plaintiff had been released), with
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding release does not
excuse § 1983 plaintiff from obligation to exhaust, even if he can no longer do
it), and Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) (declining to follow
the five-Justice consensus of Spencer v. Kemna).
38 Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18-19, 21, 25 n.8.
12
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present significant analytical problems in real litigation. Heck does
not say that a person convicted of a crime cannot bring an action
for damages, or any other type of action, connected to that crime.
As noted, the Heck rule turns on whether a civil action "necessarily
require[s] the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction
or confinement. . . ."" An attorney needs to look very closely at
what was actually presented and what was decided in the prior
criminal action in order to determine whether his or her client's
subsequent civil rights action challenging the events connected
with conviction necessarily implies its invalidity.
By way of example, consider that a criminal defendant
convicted of a crime may well have been unconstitutionally beaten
by the police during arrest. That defendant should be able to file a
suit and demonstrate that he or she was unconstitutionally beaten
in violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable force regardless of the outcome of the criminal trial
since there is no inconsistency between being guilty of a crime and
being abused by the police.4" Let us slice things a little thinner.
39 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
40 Jackson v. Suffolk County Homicide Bureau, 135 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.
1998).
13
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Suppose that the claim the criminal defendant wishes to assert in a
federal civil rights action is closely related to the crime of which he
was convicted; for example, an excessive force claim by someone
convicted of resisting arrest. Does the conviction show that, as a
matter of law, the defendant was not unconstitutionally beaten, for
resisting arrest must mean that he was doing something to justify
the police in the use of force?
Not necessarily. The court must closely examine the
defense and prosecution evidence and theories of the case
including, but not limited to, an examination of the trial transcript
in some cases. If the criminal defendant went to trial in state court
on the theory that he or she did not do anything and that the police
came along and started banging on him or her, and nonetheless he
or she was convicted of resisting arrest, then the Heck rule will
probably preclude the defendant from bringing a damage suit about
that alleged police beating, since success in that suit would
necessarily show that the factual basis of the underlying criminal
conviction was false. However, if the defendant's allegation was,
"I fought the law but the law won," and that after the police finally
subdued and restrained the resisting defendant, they stomped and
14
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beat him or her, a conviction for resisting arrest is not at all
inconsistent with a claim that the defendant was subsequently
beaten in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 '
The next Supreme Court case that implicated the holding in
Heck is Edwards v. Balisok.2  Decided in 1997, this case
considered the application of Heck in prison disciplinary
proceedings. The Supreme Court had addressed this subject in
1973 in Preiser v. Rodriguez, which held that a state prisoner
cannot obtain from a federal court the return of "good time" (time
off for good behavior) taken in prison disciplinary proceedings
except via habeas corpus after exhaustion of administrative
remedies, since such a request is a challenge to the fact or duration
of state custody.43
Edwards addressed the question of whether a prisoner who
has lost good time in a disciplinary proceeding can obtain other
relief besides return of good time. The answer is no; a federal
court may not entertain a proceeding that would "necessarily imply
41 See Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
claim of excessive force at a different time from the acts of resistance is not
barred under Heck by a resisting arrest conviction).
42 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
4' 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
15
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the invalidity" .of a proceeding in which good time was lost,
regardless of the relief sought." Consistently with the logic and
holding of Heck, the convict must first bring an action in a state
forum and have it resolved favorably, either administratively or
judicially, or obtain a favorable decision via federal habeas corpus
after state remedies have been exhausted.45
A practitioner must be careful in applying the
Heck/Balisock rule because there are some significant differences
between criminal proceedings and prison disciplinary proceedings
that affect their application. If a person convicted of a crime
brings a federal civil rights action on the ground that, "I didn't do
it," then the litigant has a problem under Heck v. Humphrey
because the claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the
conviction. However, if the litigant's assertion is that he was
convicted on a prison disciplinary defense and, "I didn't do it, they
made it up, they framed me, the officer lied," then that claim does
not imply the invalidity of the prison disciplinary proceeding
because lying to obtain a prison disciplinary conviction does not
44 Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646.
41 Id. at 649.
16
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violate the Constitution.
You may find that proposition startling, but the Second
Circuit has held precisely that in Freeman v. Rideout,46 consistently
with every other circuit that has passed on the question.47
Essentially, in prison disciplinary proceedings the convict is
entitled to have state officials touch all of the procedural bases, and
that is it. If the charges were trumped up intentionally by
employees of the state for malicious purposes but the convict
received a hearing and it met procedural standards, the convict is
out of luck.
The importance of this point is that prisoners are not
limited in the substantive allegations they may pursue in federal
civil rights litigation by the findings and conclusions of prison
disciplinary proceedings. An allegation that prison staff assaulted
a prisoner does not "necessarily imply the invalidity" of a prison
finding that the prisoner assaulted staff and was properly
46 808 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1986).
41 See, e.g., Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Hanrahan
v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984).
17
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restrained, as long as the prisoner's suit does not seek to overturn
the disciplinary proceeding."
I would now like to move on to a doctrine that is somewhat
similar and somewhat dissimilar to the Heck doctrine. Heck and
Balisok stand for the proposition that if a challenge is raised in
federal court that "would necessarily imply the invalidity" of the
state proceeding, then the plaintiff cannot pursue it while the result
of the state proceeding stands. The notion of "necessarily
imply[ing] the invalidity" of the prior state decision is analogous to
notions of preclusion, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. In each
instance, the question is whether there is an existing adjudication
of the same issues that should bind a party that is trying to bring a
new lawsuit.
There is a fundamental difference, however. The holdings
in Heck and Edwards are directed to whether a federal civil
proceeding is inconsistent in a legally significant sense with the
result of a prior state proceeding that affects the fact or duration of
state custody. Thus, the restrictions of the Heck/Balisok doctrine
48 See, e.g., Marquez v. Guttierez, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1023-25 (E.D. Cal.
1999), rev'd on other grounds, 322 F.3d 689 (9th Cir 2003) (holding excessive
force claim not barred by disciplinary conviction).
18
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operate only one way, from state proceedings to subsequent federal
proceedings, and on a limited category of cases, namely those
implicating criminal judgments, sentences, and administrative
adjustments to custodial sentences. By contrast, preclusion
doctrines may apply without regard to the existence of a penal
sanction in the prior case and from federal to state cases as well as
from state to federal ones. State to federal preclusion is both
strengthened and limited by the Full Faith and Credit Statute,49
which demands that the judgments of state forums be given the
same preclusive effect in federal court that they would receive in
the state's own courts.
The statutory command to look to state preclusion law is
much more than formalism because there are significant variations
among states. In Virginia, for example, it appears that the law
affords no preclusive effect to a judgment in a state criminal
proceeding in a subsequent civil proceeding." Criminal to civil
preclusion just does not exist, contrary to the law in many, perhaps
" 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
50 See, e.g., Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 579-81 (Va.
1987).
19
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most, jurisdictions." Another kind of example arises in New York
where judgments in Article 78 proceedings, which are a sort of
expedited administrative proceeding in which a plaintiff generally
cannot recover damages, are not deemed preclusive in a
subsequent suit for damages.12 The Second Circuit has applied that
body of law in Section 1983 actions, as it must.
5 3
Further, there is an exception to the Full Faith and Credit
doctrine. It is a case law based exception which provides that
regardless of what state law requires, a party must have had a full
and fair opportunity in the state proceeding to litigate the issues
that are now being contested in federal court, or preclusion will not
apply.54 While the Supreme Court has stated that courts need only
look to minimal standards of due process to make a determination
of whether or not a party had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate,55 the issue is a little more complicated than that.
51 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding that findings
on a state suppression motion could collaterally estop the plaintiff in a
subsequent § 1983 Fourth Amendment suit).
52 Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1986). But see
Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56, 60-61 (2d.Cir. 1996) (giving preclusive
effect to a legal determination made on undisputed facts in an Article 78
proceeding).
53 Davidson, 792 F.2d at 278-79.
54 Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461,480-81 (1982).
55 Id.
20
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Consider this example: There are many federal court cases
about whether there was probable cause to arrest somebody.
Arrestees are entitled to a judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause." Would such a determination not be preclusive in
federal court if it were preclusive under state law? Not necessarily.
The reality of criminal practice in many states is that the probable
cause hearing a suspect receives is not a plenary determination of
probable cause made on a fully adversarial proceeding and record.
Essentially, it is a proceeding in which the judge looks to see if the
prosecution has a prima facie case, and the ability of the criminal
defendant to put in evidence or even to cross-examine and
otherwise test the evidence on which the prosecution relies is
extremely limited. In those situations, federal courts may hold that
the suspect did not have a sufficiently full and fair opportunity to
litigate to preclude the suspect from pursuing a false arrest claim in
federal court. Indeed, state law may limit preclusion under these
circumstances, making it unnecessary for the federal court to reach
the "full and fair opportunity" question." Such considerations as
56 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112-13.
57 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1991).
21
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restrictions on presenting evidence, a lack of discovery, and lack of
time to prepare have also been applied to assess the fairness of
other kinds of state proceedings for purposes of application of the
preclusion rule."
Administrative agency findings may also be given
preclusive effect if they would be treated as preclusive in the state's
own courts, as long as the administrative agency acted in a judicial
capacity, resolved disputed issues of fact, and afforded the parties
an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues.5 9  However,
decisions made by certain types of administrative bodies are
generally not considered to have preclusive effect. For example,
prison disciplinary decisions are not given preclusive effect
because no one seriously contends that such bodies are
quasi-judicial," and in any case the standard of due process
58 See, e.g., Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 895-96 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding
inadequate notice and preparation time made state proceeding non-preclusive);
Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968, 972 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding lack of discovery
and difference in burden of proof prevented summary subpoena enforcement
proceeding from having preclusive effect).
59 Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986).
60 Johnson v. Freeburn, 144 F. Supp. 2d 817, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting
that a preclusion rule would result in pressure on hearing officers not to dismiss
disciplinary charges); Marquez v. Gutierrez, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1027 (E.D.
Cal. 1999) (noting state court's holding that a disciplinary hearing is not a
"judicial-type adversary proceeding" and is not conducted by a "detached and
neutral judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity"). The Supreme Court made
22
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required of them is so compromised by concerns for prison
security that it is doubtful whether they can ever provide a full and
fair opportunity to litigate a constitutional claim." State law may
similar observations in holding that prison disciplinary hearing officers are
entitled only to qualified immunity and not absolute quasi-judicial immunity:
We do not perceive the discipline committee's function as a
"classic" adjudicatory one, as petitioners would describe it....
Surely, the members of the committee, unlike a federal or state
judge, are not "independent"; to say that they are is to ignore
reality. They are not professional hearing officers, as are
administrative law judges. They are, instead, prison officials,
albeit no longer of the rank and file, temporarily diverted from
their usual duties. . . . They are employees of the Bureau of
Prisons and they are the direct subordinates of the warden who
reviews their decision. They work with the fellow employee
who lodges the charge against the inmate upon whom they sit
in judgment. The credibility determination they make is one
between a co-worker and an inmate. They thus are under
obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of
the institution and their fellow employee. . . . It is the old
situational problem of the relationship between the keeper and
the kept, a relationship that hardly is conducive to a truly
adjudicatory performance.
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1985).
61 Johnson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (noting that prisoners can be convicted at
disciplinary hearings on hearsay from confidential informants). See Colon v.
Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1995) (questioning whether collateral
estoppel is applicable in prison disciplinary hearings) (dictum). See generally
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (denying prisoners right of
confrontation and cross-examination; holding the right to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence limited by "institutional safety [and] correctional
goals;" denying right to counsel). The Supreme Court cited similar
considerations in denying federal prison disciplinary hearing officers absolute
immunity:
The prisoner was to be afforded neither a lawyer nor an
independent nonstaff representative. There was no right to
compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine.
There was no right to discovery. There was no cognizable
burden of proof. No verbatim transcript was afforded.
Information presented often was hearsay or self-serving. The
committee members were not truly independent. In sum, the
23
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also explicitly make these determinations non-preclusive.62 Police
review boards, many of which are often explicitly investigatory
rather than judicial in nature, present similar questions as to their
preclusivity.63
I would like to turn now to questions of standing. This is
probably the biggest, most serious and complicated issue that
members had no identification with the judicial process of the
kind and depth that has occasioned absolute immunity.
Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 206.
62 Johnson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 823; Marquez, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
63 Two cases involving Chicago police employees are informative. In Banks
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 793 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the employee was
discharged for misconduct after a hearing before the Chicago Police Board. The
court held that the Board acted in a judicial capacity because the proceeding:
entail[ed] the essential elements of an adjudication . . .
includ[ing] (1) adequate notice; (2) a right to present evidence
on one's own behalf, and to rebut evidence presented by the
opposition; (3) a formulation of issues of law and fact; (4) a
final decision; and (5) the procedural elements to determine
conclusively the issues in question.
Id. at 796.
By contrast, in Cosey v. City of Chicago, 33 F. Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Ill. 1999),
the police employee received a hearing before the Complaint Review Panel,
apparently because a lesser sanction had been sought than in Banks. The court
held that this body was not judicial and lacked procedural safeguards required
for its findings to be preclusive:
The Complaint Review Panel is an investigatory body with
advisory powers only. The Panel does not provide the accused
with an opportunity to examine or cross-examine witnesses or
to present memoranda of law. The Panel also has no power to
subpoena witnesses. Because the Panel has no adjudicatory
powers, it is not authorized to reach final findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Rather, the Panel is limited to making
recommendations to the Superintendent of Police. The
Superintendent can accept, reject or modify the Panel's
recommendation.
Id. at 719.
24
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attorneys who practice in the area of injunctive litigation against
the criminal justice system face. The basic requirements of
standing are very familiar. The plaintiff must have a personal
injury or threat of injury; the injury has to be fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury has to be likely to be redressed by
the relief sought." The context for most of these standing
arguments in criminal justice litigation is set by the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.6" In Lyons, the
Supreme Court held that a person who alleged that he had been
choked by the police for no apparent reason lacked standing to
seek injunctive relief, though he could seek damages, against the
police officers' use of chokeholds because there was no showing of
likelihood that he would again be subjected to that practice. 66
Lyons represented the first occasion that the Supreme Court
analyzed standing separately for injunctive relief and for damages.
64 Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing N.E. Florida
Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 663-64 (1993); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); AMSAT Cable
v. Cablevision of Connecticut, 6 F.3d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1993); Heldman v.
Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1992); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 829
(2d Cir. 1991)).65461 U.S. 95 (1983).
66 Id. at 105-06.
25
Boston: Criminal Justice System
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
594 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 19
It stated that in order to show a sufficient likelihood of recurrence,
the plaintiff would have to make the "incredible assertion" that
either all of the police officers from Los Angeles always choke any
citizen whom they attempt to apprehend or encounter, or that the
City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such a manner.67
This decision was viewed as a near fatal blow to civil rights
litigation at the time that it was issued and was characterized as
establishing a test that no plaintiff could ever meet.68 In fact,
matters have not really worked out that way. Many of the critics of
the decision paid insufficient attention to the Court's statement that
the plaintiff could prevail by proving that the City had ordered or
authorized police officers to act in the manner in which they did.69
There is also a semantic issue in Lyons. Although the
Supreme Court framed its holding in terms of likelihood of
6 7 id.
68 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, which is representative of much of the
reaction to Lyons from the civil rights community, stated:
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional
violations from the equitable powers of a federal court. It
immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that
authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as
long as no individual can establish with substantial certainty
that he will be injured or injured again, in the future.
Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).69 1d. at 106.
26
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recurrence, which is an idea that we tend to think of in quantitative
terms (e.g., a forty percent chance of rain rising to eighty percent
by nightfall), the way this issue of likelihood of recurrence has
been treated is more qualitative than quantitative. A close look at
Lyons, the cases on which it relies, and its progeny suggests that
what is really going on is not so much a discussion about
likelihood in any kind of literal sense, much less a quantitative
sense, but a discussion of whether or not the controversy between
the plaintiff and the defendant is sufficiently well-defined for the
courts to be able to deal effectively with it given the nature of the
judicial process and the role of the courts.
The Supreme Court has, in some of its other standing
cases, expressed a concern that the courts should not be
entertaining "generalized grievances" that are "pervasively shared
and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.""°
In Lyons, the Court stated, "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he
will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled
to an injunction than any other citizen ... .""' "[N]o more entitled
'0 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975)).71Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
27
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., . than any other.citizen" is.realythekey -phrase, and it- suggests
that, the Cou, is. concemed- about.,litigationusurping the functions
of, the .executive and legislative bodies. Though the case's main
holding is, stated -in terms, of the. likelihood, of. recurrence, actual
prpbability,is really not, the central:concern.
q, .J ,t, years since Lyons, the courts have been faced
repeatedly with difficult questions of- standing in litigation
challenging, police, misconduct, in., particular the numerous recent
qases,alleging racial profiling - i.e.,. discriminatory police,conduct
directed tqwards persons who are "driving. while- black,'" "walking
while black," "breathing while black," and, so on.. Courts. haye,
weighed, several factors in making these standing.determinations.
First, ,they,;have given great emphasis to.,the language,.in Lyons,
stating that theplaintiff couldhave, prevailed if he, had shown that
the conduct he. complained. of.was,,ordered or, authorized7 2 .. The -
Lyons., pinion makes it clear -that, the :question whether or not there-
was a. -municipal ,policy.:tha..,auhorized what .,happened, 'to: Mr?
Lyonsyas actually litigated, and, Mr. 1Lyons Jost.!, The distrit *co.urt.,
72 Id. at 106.
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found that there was no policy, and the Supreme Court stated that
particular issue was not before it on certiorari, and so it assumed
that there was no policy. 73  A great deal of what the Court
determined in Lyons is based on that premise. Many of the lower
courts have taken the position that if a plaintiff can demonstrate
that there is an administrative policy underlying the challenged
conflict, then the plaintiff has essentially overcome the Lyons
standing requirement.74
These decisions reflect the considerable elaboration since
Lyons of the holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services75
concerning policy based municipal liability. Many of these cases
involve concepts and ways of pleading and proving policy that
really scarcely existed at the time Lyons was decided but which
now are part of the standard toolkit of plaintiffs' lawyers in civil
73 Id. at 110. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.4 (1984) (holding that
persons subject to an ongoing law enforcement policy have standing to
challenge the policy).
74 See DeShawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1998); Church v.
City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1338-39 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. County
of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1993); Roe v. City of New York,
151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nat'l Cong. for Puerto Rican
Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
7 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a "local government may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents;"
however, the "government as an entity is responsible under § 1983" for injuries
inflicted through the "execution of a government's policy or custom").
29
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rights cases. As matters now stand, once the plaintiff can
demonstrate the existence of a policy, there tends not to be any
further inquiry about the likelihood of recurrence. In effect, if not
explicitly, the courts treat a showing of a policy as the equivalent
of a showing of likelihood of recurrence. If a plaintiff sufficiently
alleges the existence of a policy and alleges that the plaintiff is
within what might be described as the target zone of that policy,
arguably the plaintiff has met the concerns that the Supreme Court
expressed in Lyons using the phrase "likelihood of recurrence."76
If you step back from Lyons, a case about police practice,
and look at cases addressing standing to challenge a statute (a
statute being, of course, the most authoritative and definite kind of
policy), you will see that the way I have just characterized the
analysis is quite consistent with those decisions. In order to
engage in a pre-enforcement challenge to a criminal statute, the
Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff must show a genuine or
credible threat of enforcement." That generally means that if a
person is potentially subject to prosecution under the statute
76 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8.
7' Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1975).
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because the person intends to do something that he or she has a
constitutional right to do and the statute prohibits it, then that is a
sufficient showing of risk. As the Court phrased it in Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers National Union, standing is established if
the plaintiffs fear of prosecution is "not imaginary or wholly
speculative.""8
Another reason that courts have cited in holding Lyons
inapplicable to attempts to seek injunctions against criminal justice
agencies and police forces is that the challenged practice, whether
asserted as a policy or not, seeks to target an identifiable subgroup,
for example, the homeless,79 or the residents of a particular, mostly
minority neighborhood, 0 or participants in state authorized needle
exchange programs in known drug areas.8 ' When a practice is
focused on a small number or a well-defined group of people, it
does not present the concern evident in Lyons that the plaintiffs
claim for injunctive relief is no different from any other citizen's
claim for that relief, and at best, he or she has a "generalized
78442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). Accord, Younger, 401 U.S. at 42. See also United
States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 259-61 (3d Cir. 2001).
79 Church, 30 F.3d at 1338-39.
8( Thomas, 978 F.2d at 507-08.
S' Roe, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
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grievance" better addressed by the other branches of the
government.
Another issue that courts have considered in Lyons
controversies is whether or not the application of the challenged
practice depends on the plaintiffs engaging in some future
violation of the law. Mr. Lyons alleged that he committed a traffic
violation, was stopped for the violation, and then was choked while
the police were dealing with his traffic violation and issuing him a
ticket. The Supreme Court noted that for this scenario to recur, he
was going to have to violate the law again.12  There is an
understandable policy-based reluctance to allow standing to
challenge government practice to be based on the assertion, either
direct or indirect, that an offender is going to violate the law again.
The converse of this concern is that when the application of
the challenged practice does not depend on the plaintiffs further
violations of the law, the claim may be outside the concern
expressed in Lyons. This is clearly the scenario in cases of racial
profiling, where the plaintiffs allegation is that he is subjected to
82 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102-03, 108.
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police coercion based on no wrongful behavior on his part.83 The
Eleventh Circuit has applied a variation of this reasoning to people
who were mentally ill in Lynch v. Baxley, where the allegation was
not that the particular policy related to the incarceration of
mentally ill people was being applied to innocent people, but that it
was being applied to people who, by hypothesis, were not able to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law, and therefore
were not responsible for their conduct and for decisions to violate
the law, as Mr. Lyons was presumed to be."
This last cited factor has particular application in prison
and parole litigation, given the nature of the regimes of supervision
involved. That is, you can be arrested, you can be charged, you
can be locked up, you can be thrown in the hole, or worse, for
many things that do not, violate the criminal law, but that violate
the much more restrictive rules of conduct that apply in institutions
or the restrictive rules of parole. 5
83 See, e.g., Nat'l Cong., 75 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (noting allegation that
"plaintiffs were stopped while engaging in everyday tasks").
84 744 F.2d 1452, 1457 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
85 Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 881 (9th Cir. 2001) (Berzon, J.
concurring).
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Moreover, prison life and parole supervision are by nature
vastly different from the life of a free citizen. In Rizzo v. Goode,
the Supreme Court suggested a lack of standing in a police case,
noting that the alleged misconduct was taking place "at large in a
city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen."86  The
treatment of prisoners at the hands of prison staff by definition
does not occur "at large" in a city of three million people, and it
does not involve many thousands of police officers. It occurs in a
very narrow and restrictive setting. Furthermore, the setting is one
where the encounter with law enforcement is not intermittent; it is
not unpredictable; and it is not occasional. It is continuous and
unavoidable. Prisoners are under rigorous supervision by people
whose job it is at all times to impose on them a kind of surveillance
and discipline that none of us are subjected to,87 except possibly
when we are in court in front of a judge.
The conceptualization of the relevant rights is also different
in prison litigation. The Supreme Court has recognized that
86 423 U.S. 362, 373 (1976).
87 See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
harassment by prison staff is "made possible by the correctional environment").
See also Armstrong, 257 F.3d at 881 (Berzon, J. concurring ) (citing "the fact of
34
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imprisonment so restricts liberty that prisoners must rely on
government to protect their safety and has held that their
substantive rights are violated by unreasonable risks to their future
health and safety, even if it is impossible to predict which prisoners
will be harmed or will inflict the harm."s In other words, it is
exposure to the risk of harm, and not necessarily the actual
occurrence of the harm, that is unconstitutional when the
government disables persons by incarcerating them. This point is
sharpened by the Court's citation as examples of actionable
"threats to personal safety" the existence of "exposed electrical
wiring, deficient firefighting measures, and the mingling of
inmates with serious contagious diseases with other prison
inmates."89 Thus, prisoners' allegations of a pattern of assault by
staff, or assault by other prisoners resulting from a failure to
mandatory ongoing interactions with law enforcement officials" as a factor
supporting standing to challenge parole practice).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843-44 (1994) (holding that it is irrelevant
whether the risk of inmate on inmate assault stems from one or numerous
sources, "any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of
attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face
such a risk," and that prisoners at risk need not await assault before seeking
relief); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that prisoners
may seek relief against unsafe conditions that "pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to [a prisoner's] future health," even if the damage has not yet
occurred and the condition may not affect every prisoner exposed to it).
'9 Helling, 509 U.S. at 34.
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supervise, or dangers resulting from the environment or structure
of the prison present fundamentally different legal issues from
cases like Lyons or Rizzo.
We will find out what other courts think about this in the
not too distant future. My office has filed a case challenging
excessive use of force in those New York City jails where we have
not already prevailed on this issue.9" The class certification motion
is presently pending before Judge Chin. For the first time, the City
has raised the claim in opposition to class certification that the
named plaintiffs have no right to seek relief because they cannot
demonstrate that they are going to be beaten again at any
ascertainable time or place. In all of our prior use of force
litigation, the City consented to class certification.9' The City's
new litigation position simply illustrates that the assertion of
90 Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279 (S.D.N.Y.), amended complaint filed Sept. 6,
2002.
9' See e.g., Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(terminating consent decree addressing excessive force in Rikers Island Central
Punitive Segregation Unit on the ground that it had solved the problem); Jackson
v. Montemagno, No. 85 Civ. 2384 (AS), Order Approving Stipulation for Entry
of Judgment (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 26, 1991) (entering consent judgment to control
excessive force in Brooklyn House of Detention); Reynolds v. Ward, No. 81
Civ. 101 (PNL), Order and Consent Judgment 42-48 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1990)
(adopting consent judgment with measures to control excessive force in jail
hospital wards).
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standing barriers reflects political issues as well as legal ones, and I
leave you to draw your own conclusions on that subject."
92 The motion under discussion was subsequently decided in plaintiff's favor,
with Judge Chin rejecting the Lyons argument as applied to a jail excessive force
claim for substantially the reasons stated above. Ingles v. City of New York, 01
Civ. 8279, 2003 WL 402565, at * 8-9 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 20, 2003).
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